The core of Shapley-Scarf markets with couples (Q533914): Difference between revisions

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Property / DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.12.002 / rank
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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.12.002 / rank
 
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Property / OpenAlex ID: W1968450383 / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Stable matchings and preferences of couples / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask) / rank
 
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Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Corrigendum to ``stable matchings and preferences of couples'' / rank
 
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Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: On the Shapley-Scarf economy: The case of multiple types of indivisible goods / rank
 
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Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods / rank
 
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Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q3999327 / rank
 
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Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: On cores and indivisibility / rank
 
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Property / DOI
 
Property / DOI: 10.1016/J.JMATECO.2010.12.002 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 20:43, 9 December 2024

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The core of Shapley-Scarf markets with couples
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