Optimal auctions for multi-unit procurement with volume discount bids (Q840628): Difference between revisions
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Latest revision as of 11:03, 30 July 2024
scientific article
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | Optimal auctions for multi-unit procurement with volume discount bids |
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Optimal auctions for multi-unit procurement with volume discount bids (English)
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13 September 2009
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Summary: In this paper, we design an optimal procurement mechanism for procuring multiple units of a single homogeneous item based on volume discount bids submitted by rational and intelligent suppliers. We develop an elegant auction mechanism, VD-OPT, that minimises the cost to the buyer and satisfies at the same time both Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC) and interim individual rationality.
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multi-unit procurement
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volume discounts
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incentive compatibility
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individual rationality
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optimal mechanisms
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optimisation
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optimal auctions
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volume discount bids
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