Equilibria under deferred acceptance: dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare (Q2437848): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 10:53, 7 July 2024

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Equilibria under deferred acceptance: dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare
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    Equilibria under deferred acceptance: dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare (English)
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    13 March 2014
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    many-to-one matching
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    deferred acceptance
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    Nash equilibrium
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    dropping strategies
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    filled positions
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    welfare
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