Power of voters and domain of preferences where voting by committees is strategy-proof (Q1906707): Difference between revisions
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Latest revision as of 20:03, 19 March 2024
scientific article
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | Power of voters and domain of preferences where voting by committees is strategy-proof |
scientific article |
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Power of voters and domain of preferences where voting by committees is strategy-proof (English)
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6 February 1996
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\textit{S. Barbera}, \textit{H. Sonnenschein}, and \textit{L. Zhou} [Econometrica 59, No. 3, 595-609 (1991; Zbl 0734.90006)] introduced a restriction on the domain of individual preferences for which there exist a class of strategy-proof social choice functions, which they called voting by committees. The author gives a generalization of this restriction and shows that the restricted domain one obtains is the maximal one where voting by committees is strategy-proof except for extreme cases.
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strategy-proof social choice functions
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voting by committees
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