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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.11.011 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 10:35, 7 July 2024

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Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
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    Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty (English)
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    3 March 2014
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    behavioral mechanism design
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    implementation
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    lying costs
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    separable domain
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