The Copeland choice function. An axiomatic characterization (Q1082226): Difference between revisions
From MaRDI portal
Removed claim: author (P16): Item:Q810354 |
ReferenceBot (talk | contribs) Changed an Item |
||
(2 intermediate revisions by 2 users not shown) | |||
Property / author | |||
Property / author: Dominique Henriet / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Property / MaRDI profile type | |||
Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Property / cites work | |||
Property / cites work: Q5615282 / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Property / cites work | |||
Property / cites work: Consistency, Rationality and Collective Choice / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Property / cites work | |||
Property / cites work: Q5585195 / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Property / cites work | |||
Property / cites work: Ranking the Participants in a Tournament / rank | |||
Normal rank |
Latest revision as of 16:24, 17 June 2024
scientific article
Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
---|---|---|---|
English | The Copeland choice function. An axiomatic characterization |
scientific article |
Statements
The Copeland choice function. An axiomatic characterization (English)
0 references
1985
0 references
Consider a social choice problem with a finite number of voters and alternatives. Let P be the majority preference relation and I, the majority indifference relation. The Copeland score for alternative x is the sum of the scores of x against all other alternatives y (xPy is worth two points, xIy is worth one point, yPx is worth zero points for x). The Copeland choice rule picks the alternatives with maximum Copeland scores. This paper gives an axiomatic characterization of the Copeland choice rule. It is the only choice rule satisfying independence of irrelevant alternatives, strong monotonicity, neutrality, and independence of cycles.
0 references
majority rule
0 references
finite number of voters
0 references
Copeland score
0 references
axiomatic characterization
0 references