How the size of a coalition affects its chances to influence an election (Q2500745): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 03:01, 14 November 2024

scientific article
Language Label Description Also known as
English
How the size of a coalition affects its chances to influence an election
scientific article

    Statements

    How the size of a coalition affects its chances to influence an election (English)
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    18 August 2006
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    social choice rule
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    impartial anonymous culture
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    coalition
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    manipulability
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    Identifiers