Stable matchings and equilibrium outcomes of the Gale-Shapley's algorithm for the marriage problem (Q1178254): Difference between revisions
From MaRDI portal
Set profile property. |
Set OpenAlex properties. |
||
(One intermediate revision by one other user not shown) | |||
Property / cites work | |||
Property / cites work: Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Property / cites work | |||
Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Property / cites work | |||
Property / cites work: Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Property / cites work | |||
Property / cites work: The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Property / cites work | |||
Property / cites work: Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Property / full work available at URL | |||
Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(91)90050-u / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Property / OpenAlex ID | |||
Property / OpenAlex ID: W2078929198 / rank | |||
Normal rank |
Latest revision as of 09:58, 30 July 2024
scientific article
Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
---|---|---|---|
English | Stable matchings and equilibrium outcomes of the Gale-Shapley's algorithm for the marriage problem |
scientific article |
Statements
Stable matchings and equilibrium outcomes of the Gale-Shapley's algorithm for the marriage problem (English)
0 references
26 June 1992
0 references
deferred acceptance algorithm
0 references
marriage problem
0 references
stable matching
0 references