The hybrid solutions of an \(n\)-person game (Q1187870): Difference between revisions

From MaRDI portal
Import240304020342 (talk | contribs)
Set profile property.
Set OpenAlex properties.
 
(One intermediate revision by one other user not shown)
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The Core of a Cooperative Game Without Side Payments / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Extensions of two fixed point theorems of F. E. Browder / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Introduction to sensitivity and stability analysis in nonlinear programming / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: A Social Coalitional Equilibrium Existence Lemma / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Alternative Version of Shapley's Theorem on Closed Coverings of a Simplex / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The core of a cooperative game without side payments / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The Core of an N Person Game / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q5684536 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q3272922 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / full work available at URL
 
Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(92)90010-p / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / OpenAlex ID
 
Property / OpenAlex ID: W1987890726 / rank
 
Normal rank

Latest revision as of 10:59, 30 July 2024

scientific article
Language Label Description Also known as
English
The hybrid solutions of an \(n\)-person game
scientific article

    Statements

    The hybrid solutions of an \(n\)-person game (English)
    0 references
    3 August 1992
    0 references
    For an \(n\)-person game in strategic form, we introduce the concept of hybrid solution. For a given coalitional structure or a partition of players, the associated hybrid solution of the game is one in which different coalitions behave in a non-cooperative fashion, but within each coalition the players cooperate among themselves. The hybrid solution becomes the ordinary Nash equilibrium when the partition is finest (all coalitions are singletons), and becomes the alpha core when the partition consists of only one coalition: the grand coalition or the set of all players. Our main theorem is that the set of hybrid solutions for a given coalition is not empty if each player's strategy set is a compact convex set, and if each player's payoff function is continuous in the strategies of all players and quasi-concave in the strategies of those players belonging to his coalition. This becomes the Nash theorem when the partition is finest, and it becomes the Scarf theorem when the partition is coarsest.
    0 references
    strategic form
    0 references
    hybrid solution
    0 references
    coalitional structure
    0 references
    Nash equilibrium
    0 references
    alpha core
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references

    Identifiers