Random aggregation without the Pareto principle (Q427548): Difference between revisions

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+https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-011-0111-5
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+W2082957400
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+Q2783476
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Preference aggregation with randomized social orderings
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+Collective Probabilistic Judgements
@@ Property / cites work: Collective Probabilistic Judgements / rank @@
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+A new solution to the random assignment problem.
@@ Property / cites work: A new solution to the random assignment problem. / rank @@
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+A simple random assignment problem with a unique solution
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+Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences
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+Collective choice under dichotomous preferences
@@ Property / cites work: Collective choice under dichotomous preferences / rank @@
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+Fuzzy Arrow-type results without the Pareto principle based on fuzzy pre-orders
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+Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
@@ Property / cites work: Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result / rank @@
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+Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
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+Acyclic Choice without the Pareto Principle
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+A note on social choice theory without the Pareto principle
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+Randomized preference aggregation: Additivity of power and strategy proofness
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+Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
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