Condorcet meets Bentham (Q492869): Difference between revisions

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Property / DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.04.006 / rank
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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.04.006 / rank
 
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Property / OpenAlex ID: W264156656 / rank
 
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Property / Wikidata QID: Q56081054 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 20:17, 9 December 2024

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Condorcet meets Bentham
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