Optimal selling mechanisms with countervailing positive externalities and an application to tradable retaliation in the WTO (Q617590): Difference between revisions

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+https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.06.007
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+W1966210300
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+Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case
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+Optimal selling mechanisms with countervailing positive externalities and an application to tradable retaliation in the WTO
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+The role of optimal threats in auction design
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+Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
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+Participation constraints in adverse selection models
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+Countervailing incentives in agency problems
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+On countervailing incentives
@@ Property / cites work: On countervailing incentives / rank @@
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+Optimal Auction Design
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+Some Minimax Theorems.
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