Cardinal Bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers (Q665457): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 00:23, 10 December 2024

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Cardinal Bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers
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    Cardinal Bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers (English)
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    5 March 2012
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    nontransfer mechanism design
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    allocation
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    private information
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