A folk theorem for the one-dimensional spatial bargaining model (Q891336): Difference between revisions

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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-014-0460-8 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 01:37, 11 July 2024

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A folk theorem for the one-dimensional spatial bargaining model
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    A folk theorem for the one-dimensional spatial bargaining model (English)
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    17 November 2015
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