Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts (Q1030169): Difference between revisions

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Property / DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.03.007 / rank
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Property / OpenAlex ID: W3122349304 / rank
 
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Property / DOI
 
Property / DOI: 10.1016/J.JMATECO.2009.03.007 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 13:53, 10 December 2024

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Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts
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