Impulsivity in binary choices and the emergence of periodicity (Q1040121): Difference between revisions

Summary: Binary choice games with externalities, as those described by \textit{T. C. Schelling} [J. Conflict Resolution 17, No.~3, 381--428 (1973)], have been recently modelled as discrete dynamical systems [\textit{G. I. Bischi} and \textit{U. Merlone}, J. Math. Soc. 33, 1--26 (2009)]. In this paper we discuss the dynamic behavior in the case in which agents are impulsive; that is; they decide to switch their choices even when the difference between payoffs is extremely small. This particular case can be seen as a limiting case of the original model and can be formalized as a piecewise linear discontinuous map. We analyze the dynamic behavior of this map, characterized by the presence of stable periodic cycles of any period that appear and disappear through border-collision bifurcations. After a numerical exploration, we study the conditions for the creation and the destruction of periodic cycles, as well as the analytic expressions of the bifurcation curves.