Gibbardian libertarian claims revisited (Q1082222): Difference between revisions
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Latest revision as of 16:23, 17 June 2024
scientific article
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English | Gibbardian libertarian claims revisited |
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Gibbardian libertarian claims revisited (English)
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1986
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Two resolution schemes for the impossibility theorems on the Gibbard- Kelly claims of libertarian rights, which are rather contrasting with each other, are proposed and their implications discussed. The first scheme asserts that there exists a collective choice rule satisfying the Pareto principle and the Gibbard-Kelly libertarian claims if there exists at least one socially unconcerned individual. The second scheme asserts the existence of an eligible collective choice rule if there exists at least one liberal individual.
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resolution schemes
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impossibility theorems
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Gibbard-Kelly claims of libertarian rights
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socially unconcerned individual
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