Condorcet efficiency and constant scoring rules (Q1162267): Difference between revisions
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| Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(82)90061-0 / rank | |||
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| Property / cites work: The probability of the paradox of voting: A computable solution / rank | |||
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| Property / cites work: Proportions of profiles with a majority candidate / rank | |||
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Latest revision as of 14:11, 13 June 2024
scientific article
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | Condorcet efficiency and constant scoring rules |
scientific article |
Statements
Condorcet efficiency and constant scoring rules (English)
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1982
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Condorcet efficiency
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constant scoring rules
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exact closed form relations
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three element rankings
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two stage constant rules
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Condorcet winner
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