Can pre-arranged matches be avoided in two-sided matching markets? (Q1294009): Difference between revisions
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| Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank | |||
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| Property / cites work: Manipulation via Endowments / rank | |||
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| Property / cites work: The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem / rank | |||
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| Property / cites work: Q3999327 / rank | |||
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| Property / cites work: Manipulating Lindahl equilibrium via endowments / rank | |||
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| Property / cites work: Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets / rank | |||
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Latest revision as of 20:08, 28 May 2024
scientific article
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | Can pre-arranged matches be avoided in two-sided matching markets? |
scientific article |
Statements
Can pre-arranged matches be avoided in two-sided matching markets? (English)
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15 September 1999
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manipulation
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pre-arranged matches
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stable
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