Pages that link to "Item:Q1294009"

The following pages link to Can pre-arranged matches be avoided in two-sided matching markets? (Q1294009):

Displaying 20 items.

• Enrollment manipulations in school choice (Q268634) (← links)
• Application fee manipulations in matching markets (Q393269) (← links)
• Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems (Q403704) (← links)
• School choice: impossibilities for affirmative action (Q423742) (← links)
• Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching (Q485428) (← links)
• Games of capacity allocation in many-to-one matching with an aftermarket (Q836923) (← links)
• The dynamics of law clerk matching: an experimental and computational investigation of proposals for reform of the market (Q956512) (← links)
• Limited choice in college admissions: an experimental study (Q1651284) (← links)
• On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems (Q1762420) (← links)
• Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation (Q1792571) (← links)
• New variable-population paradoxes for resource allocation (Q2247950) (← links)
• Unraveling results from comparable demand and supply: an experimental investigation (Q2351226) (← links)
• The welfare effects of pre-arrangements in matching markets (Q2376989) (← links)
• When preference misreporting is harm[less]ful? (Q2402812) (← links)
• Mixed strategies in games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets (Q2431838) (← links)
• Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets (Q2431839) (← links)
• Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions (Q2482681) (← links)
• MATCHING WITH COUPLES: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY SURVEY (Q2854007) (← links)
• The (Non)-Existence of Stable Mechanisms in Incomplete Information Environments (Q3460776) (← links)
• Backward unraveling over time: The evolution of strategic behavior in the entry level British medical labor markets (Q5940869) (← links)