The design of supply contracts as a problem of delegration (Q1390201): Difference between revisions
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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0377-2217(95)00068-2 / rank | |||
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Property / OpenAlex ID: W2093038453 / rank | |||
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Latest revision as of 13:09, 28 May 2024
scientific article
Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
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English | The design of supply contracts as a problem of delegration |
scientific article |
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The design of supply contracts as a problem of delegration (English)
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14 July 1998
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hierarchical planning
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information asymmetry
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self-selection models
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design of a supply contract
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