A note on forward induction in a model of representative democracy. (Q1420511): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 09:21, 30 July 2024

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A note on forward induction in a model of representative democracy.
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    A note on forward induction in a model of representative democracy. (English)
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    2 February 2004
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    Voting games
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    Refinements of Nash equilibrium
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    Citizen-candidate
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    Mertens' stable sets
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