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Latest revision as of 13:01, 30 May 2024

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Choosing from a weighted tournament
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    Choosing from a weighted tournament (English)
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    25 September 2000
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    The authors introduce three new solution concepts for weighted tournaments, which are the weighted equivalents of the Top Cycle (TC), the Uncovered set (UC), and the Minimal Covering (MC) set. They also performed a comparison of 11 solution sets for weighted and unweighted tournaments in terms of inclusion, intersection or absence of the latter. Among their conclusions are the following: 1. The weighted uncovered set \(UC_{w}\) is a superset of most other solution sets with three exceptions. \(UC_{w}\) includes the Borda winners and the Condorcet winner whenever it exists, despite the fact that it is not Condorcet consistent. 2. Let \(BP\) stand for bipartisan set. The chain of inclusions \(BP\) \(\subseteq\) \(MC\) \(\subseteq\) \(UC\) \(\subseteq\) \(TC\) established for tournaments is lost when one moves to weighted tournaments. 3. Since weighted tournaments contain more information than tournaments, one could expect solution sets for weighted tournaments to refine their tournament counterparts. However, this turns out to be the case only for \(TC\).
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    weighted tournament
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    social choice correspondence
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    set-theoretical comparison
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