Generalized assignment problem: truthful mechanism design without money (Q1727952): Difference between revisions

From MaRDI portal
Import240304020342 (talk | contribs)
Set profile property.
Normalize DOI.
 
(3 intermediate revisions by 3 users not shown)
Property / DOI
 
Property / DOI: 10.1016/j.orl.2016.12.003 / rank
Normal rank
 
Property / OpenAlex ID
 
Property / OpenAlex ID: W2516120895 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / arXiv ID
 
Property / arXiv ID: 1608.04273 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Randomized metarounding (extended abstract) / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: On the Approximability of Budgeted Allocations and Improved Lower Bounds for Submodular Welfare Maximization and GAP / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Truthful Generalized Assignments via Stable Matching / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Truthfulness and Approximation with Value-Maximizing Bidders / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Generalized assignment problem: truthful mechanism design without money / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q4273943 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: An approximation algorithm for the generalized assignment problem / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / DOI
 
Property / DOI: 10.1016/J.ORL.2016.12.003 / rank
 
Normal rank

Latest revision as of 06:07, 11 December 2024

scientific article
Language Label Description Also known as
English
Generalized assignment problem: truthful mechanism design without money
scientific article

    Statements

    Identifiers