Matching with single-peaked preferences (Q1729666): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / DOI @@
-.1016/j.jet.2018.12.004
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.12.004 / rank @@
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@@ Property / full work available at URL @@
+https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.12.004
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@@ Property / OpenAlex ID @@
+W2906482047
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID: W2906482047 / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: the top trading absorbing sets mechanisms
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+A short proof for the characterization of the core in housing markets
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+An alternative proof of a characterization of the TTC mechanism
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+On cores and indivisibility
@@ Property / cites work: On cores and indivisibility / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
@@ Property / cites work: Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods / rank @@
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@@ Property / Wikidata QID @@
+Q128706072
@@ Property / Wikidata QID: Q128706072 / rank @@
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@@ Property / DOI @@
+.1016/J.JET.2018.12.004
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2018.12.004 / rank @@
+Normal rank