Incentives and implementation in marriage markets with externalities (Q2334311): Difference between revisions

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Property / DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108688 / rank
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Property / OpenAlex ID: W2958821478 / rank
 
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Property / cites work: TWO-SIDED MATCHING WITH EXTERNALITIES: A SURVEY / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Implementation Via Nash Equilibria / rank
 
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Property / cites work: A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Nash implementation of matching rules / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Matching with Externalities / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Q3999327 / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Two-sided matching problems with externalities / rank
 
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Property / cites work: On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences / rank
 
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Property / Wikidata QID: Q127240276 / rank
 
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Property / DOI
 
Property / DOI: 10.1016/J.ECONLET.2019.108688 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 01:25, 18 December 2024

scientific article
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Incentives and implementation in marriage markets with externalities
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    Incentives and implementation in marriage markets with externalities (English)
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    7 November 2019
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    marriage market
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    externalities
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    incentives
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    implementation
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