Strategic candidacy, monotonicity, and strategy-proofness (Q1927884): Difference between revisions

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+https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2005.01.017
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+W1995758881
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID: W1995758881 / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q2783476
@@ Property / cites work: Q2783476 / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures
@@ Property / cites work: Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Candidate stability and nonbinary social choice
@@ Property / cites work: Candidate stability and nonbinary social choice / rank @@
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+Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
@@ Property / cites work: Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result / rank @@
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+Nonbinary Social Choice: An Impossibility Theorem
@@ Property / cites work: Nonbinary Social Choice: An Impossibility Theorem / rank @@
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+The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
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+Arrow's theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: A unified approach
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+Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
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