Secure implementation in economies with indivisible objects and money (Q1934842): Difference between revisions

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Property / DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2007.11.009 / rank
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Property / OpenAlex ID: W3122728893 / rank
 
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Property / DOI: 10.1016/J.ECONLET.2007.11.009 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 13:49, 16 December 2024

scientific article
Language Label Description Also known as
English
Secure implementation in economies with indivisible objects and money
scientific article

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    Secure implementation in economies with indivisible objects and money (English)
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    29 January 2013
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    secure implementation
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    dominant strategy implementation
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    Nash implementation
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    indivisible objects
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    strategy-proofness
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