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Latest revision as of 19:02, 25 July 2024

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A theory of dynamic contracting with financial constraints
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    A theory of dynamic contracting with financial constraints (English)
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    11 May 2021
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    dynamic mechanism design
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    financial constraints
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    asymmetric information
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