Fishing for fools (Q2195691): Difference between revisions

From MaRDI portal
Import240304020342 (talk | contribs)
Set profile property.
ReferenceBot (talk | contribs)
Changed an Item
 
(One intermediate revision by one other user not shown)
Property / full work available at URL
 
Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.011 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / OpenAlex ID
 
Property / OpenAlex ID: W3015756711 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions? / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Contract Design and Self-Control: Theory and Evidence / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Auction fever: rising revenue in second-price auction formats / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Contracting with Diversely Naive Agents / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The Effect of Regret on Optimal Bidding in Auctions / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Naïveté-Based Discrimination* / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Inferior Products and Profitable Deception / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Bilateral trading with naive traders / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Attention Variation and Welfare: Theory and Evidence from a Tax Salience Experiment / rank
 
Normal rank

Latest revision as of 10:00, 23 July 2024

scientific article
Language Label Description Also known as
English
Fishing for fools
scientific article

    Statements

    Fishing for fools (English)
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    27 August 2020
    0 references
    In this paper, the authors showed that two commonly used market mechanisms, fixed-price markets and auctions, amplify rather than reduce the effect of behavioral biases on prices and other market outcomes. This amplifying effect has been studied in various market settings. The main result is the following: Proposition. The effect of biased buyers on expected revenue is amplified, relative to the no-selection benchmark, \begin{itemize} \item[a)] in the auction for all \(\pi\) (probability of bias) above a low bound (of order \(\frac{1}{n^2}\)), \[ \frac{k_1}{(n-1)^2}\le \pi <1, \] \item[b)] in the fixed-price market for all \(\pi\) above a high bound (of order \(\frac{1}{n}\)), \[ \frac{k_2}{n-1}\le \pi <1. \] \end{itemize} The reader can find interesting evidence from several markets, including eBay, housing markets and financial markets.
    0 references
    auctions
    0 references
    fixed-price markets
    0 references
    behavioral biases
    0 references
    overbidding
    0 references
    amplification
    0 references

    Identifiers