Truthful unit-demand auctions with budgets revisited (Q2257295): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / DOI @@
-.1016/j.tcs.2015.01.033
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1016/j.tcs.2015.01.033 / rank @@
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@@ Property / full work available at URL @@
+https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2015.01.033
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+W2146324473
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Mechanisms for the Marriage and the Assignment Game
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Bidder optimal assignments for general utilities
@@ Property / cites work: Bidder optimal assignments for general utilities / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+The assignment game. I: The core
@@ Property / cites work: The assignment game. I: The core / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Sponsored search, market equilibria, and the Hungarian method
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q5519710
@@ Property / cites work: Q5519710 / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q5417648
@@ Property / cites work: Q5417648 / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q3794956
@@ Property / cites work: Q3794956 / rank @@
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@@ Property / DOI @@
+.1016/J.TCS.2015.01.033
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1016/J.TCS.2015.01.033 / rank @@
+Normal rank