Efficient club formation in a frictional environment (Q2345251): Difference between revisions

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+https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.10.016
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+W1992327284
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+A note on Peters and Severinov, ``Competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices''
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+Clubs and the Market
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+Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
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+Competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices
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+Equilibria, the core, and jurisdiction structures in economies with a local public good
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+The Tiebout Hypothesis: Near Optimality in Local Public Good Economies
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