Mixed strategies in games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets (Q2431838): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / DOI @@
-.1007/s00355-006-0139-6
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1007/s00355-006-0139-6 / rank @@
-Normal rank
@@ Property / full work available at URL @@
+https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0139-6
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@@ Property / OpenAlex ID @@
+W1966336485
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID: W1966336485 / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
@@ Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Non-cooperative games
@@ Property / cites work: Non-cooperative games / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q3999327
@@ Property / cites work: Q3999327 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Can pre-arranged matches be avoided in two-sided matching markets?
+Normal rank
@@ Property / DOI @@
+.1007/S00355-006-0139-6
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1007/S00355-006-0139-6 / rank @@
+Normal rank