Random matching in the college admissions problem (Q2472434): Difference between revisions

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+MaRDI publication profile
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+W2133115749
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID: W2133115749 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+House allocation with existing tenants
@@ Property / cites work: House allocation with existing tenants / rank @@
+Normal rank
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+Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
@@ Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank @@
+Normal rank
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+Stable matchings and the small core in Nash equilibrium in the college admissions problem.
+Normal rank
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+Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Voting Rules
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+The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
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+Q3999327
@@ Property / cites work: Q3999327 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
@@ Property / cites work: Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching / rank @@
+Normal rank
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+Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms
+Normal rank
@@ links / mardi / name / links / mardi / name @@
+Publication:2472434