An alternative characterization of the deferred acceptance algorithm (Q1939517): Difference between revisions

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+https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0311-9
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+W2095165028
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+Q57428130
@@ Property / Wikidata QID: Q57428130 / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
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+Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
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+A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
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+Axioms for Deferred Acceptance
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+Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
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+Q3999327
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+An impossibility theorem for matching problems
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+Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
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+Monotonicity and consistency in matching markets
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