Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets (Q5932333)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1596121
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| English | Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1596121 |
Statements
Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets (English)
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28 September 2002
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The relationships among strategy-proofness (SP), coalition strategy-proofness (CSP), individual rationality (IR), ontoness (ONTO), monotonicity (MON), individual monotonicity (IMON), nonbossiness (NB), and being of a strong core (SC) are examined in the case of single-valued solutions to housing markets with strict preferences. It is proved that the following conditions are mutually equivalent: CSP, MON, SP \& NB, and IMON\& NB. Moreover, SC is equivalent to MON\& IR\& ONTO, and also to SP \& NB \& IR \& ONTO.
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Shapley-Scarf housing market
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strong core
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coalition strategy-proofness
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monotonicity
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0.8286649584770203
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0.8165719509124756
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0.8107132315635681
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0.8026978373527527
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0.7977600693702698
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