Optimal use of correlated information in mechanism design when full surplus extraction may be impossible (Q996382): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / full work available at URL @@
-https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.05.007
-Normal rank
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID @@
-W2135252017
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID: W2135252017 / rank @@
-Normal rank
@@ Property / full work available at URL @@
+https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.05.007
+Normal rank
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID @@
+W2135252017
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID: W2135252017 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+The robustness of the independent private value model in Bayesian mechanism design
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
@@ Property / cites work: Correlated Information and Mecanism Design / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Optimal contracts with public ex post information
@@ Property / cites work: Optimal contracts with public ex post information / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Continuity in auction design
@@ Property / cites work: Continuity in auction design / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q5638112
@@ Property / cites work: Q5638112 / rank @@
+Normal rank