Direct reciprocity in structured populations (Q2962140): Difference between revisions

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+Q36056508
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+A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
@@ Property / cites work: A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames / rank @@
+Normal rank
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+The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
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+On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
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+The Evolution of Cooperation
@@ Property / cites work: The Evolution of Cooperation / rank @@
+Normal rank
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+Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata
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+Evolutionarily stable strategies in the repeated prisoner's dilemma
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+Types of evolutionary stability and the problem of cooperation.
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+Assortment of encounters and evolution of cooperativeness
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+The importance of being discrete (and spatial)
@@ Property / cites work: The importance of being discrete (and spatial) / rank @@
+Normal rank
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+Group selection, kin selection, altruism and cooperation: when inclusive fitness is right and when it can be wrong
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+Strategy selection in structured populations
@@ Property / cites work: Strategy selection in structured populations / rank @@
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+Robustness against indirect invasions
@@ Property / cites work: Robustness against indirect invasions / rank @@
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+The Algebra of Assortative Encounters and the Evolution of Cooperation
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+Collusion as public monitoring becomes noisy: Experimental evidence
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+Direct reciprocity with costly punishment: generous tit-for-tat prevails
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