Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms (Q2427870): Difference between revisions

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+Stability in dynamic matching markets
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+Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
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+Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods
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+A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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+Stability of marriage with externalities
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+Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
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+Weak stability and a bargaining set for the marriage model
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+Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems
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+Job matching and coalition formation with utility or disutility of co-workers
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+Stable one-to-one matchings with externalities
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+Stability and Preference Alignment in Matching and Coalition Formation
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+Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
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+Q3999327
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+Two-sided matching problems with externalities
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+A nonconstructive elementary proof of the existence of stable marriages
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+Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
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