Consistency without neutrality in voting rules: When is a vote an average? (Q2389767): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 19:50, 1 July 2024

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Consistency without neutrality in voting rules: When is a vote an average?
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    Consistency without neutrality in voting rules: When is a vote an average? (English)
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    18 July 2009
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    scoring rule
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    generalized scoring rule
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    mean proximity rule
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    mean neat rule
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    voting system
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    geometry of voting
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    convex
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    decomposition
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    consistent
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    connected
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    ties
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    hyperplane separation
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    Voronoi
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