Generalized assignment problem: truthful mechanism design without money (Q1727952): Difference between revisions

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-.1016/j.orl.2016.12.003
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1016/j.orl.2016.12.003 / rank @@
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+.04273
@@ Property / arXiv ID: 1608.04273 / rank @@
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+Randomized metarounding (extended abstract)
@@ Property / cites work: Randomized metarounding (extended abstract) / rank @@
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+On the Approximability of Budgeted Allocations and Improved Lower Bounds for Submodular Welfare Maximization and GAP
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+Truthful Generalized Assignments via Stable Matching
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+Truthfulness and Approximation with Value-Maximizing Bidders
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+Generalized assignment problem: truthful mechanism design without money
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+Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
@@ Property / cites work: Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result / rank @@
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+Q4273943
@@ Property / cites work: Q4273943 / rank @@
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+Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
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+An approximation algorithm for the generalized assignment problem
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@@ Property / DOI @@
+.1016/J.ORL.2016.12.003
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1016/J.ORL.2016.12.003 / rank @@
+Normal rank