Money and dynamic credit arrangements with private information (Q1572944): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / cites work @@
+Repeated principal-agent relationships with lending and borrowing
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+On Efficient Distribution with Private Information
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Efficiency and equality in a simple model of efficient unemployment insurance
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+A Difficulty with the Optimum Quantity of Money
@@ Property / cites work: A Difficulty with the Optimum Quantity of Money / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Liquidity and interest rates
@@ Property / cites work: Liquidity and interest rates / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Repeated moral hazard and one-sided commitment
@@ Property / cites work: Repeated moral hazard and one-sided commitment / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Computing Multi-Period, Information-Constrained Optima
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
@@ Property / cites work: On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Currency and Credit are Equivalent Mechanisms
@@ Property / cites work: Currency and Credit are Equivalent Mechanisms / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Dynamic Insurance with Private Information and Balanced Budgets
+Normal rank