Contractual signaling, relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements (Q485745): Difference between revisions

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+Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information
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+Signalling and Renegotiation in Contractual Relationships
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+Contract, renegotiation, and holdup: Results on the technology of trade and investment
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+Incomplete Contracts, Specific Investments, and Risk Sharing
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+Q2816007
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+The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
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+The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
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+Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
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+On the interplay of hidden action and hidden information in simple bilateral trading problems
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+The Mirrlees Approach to Mechanism Design with Renegotiation (with Applications to Hold-up and Risk Sharing)
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+Contractual signaling, relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements
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+Contract, Mechanism Design, and Technological Detail
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