What you gotta know to play good in the iterated prisoner's dilemma (Q1651791): Difference between revisions
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Latest revision as of 01:11, 11 December 2024
scientific article
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English | What you gotta know to play good in the iterated prisoner's dilemma |
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What you gotta know to play good in the iterated prisoner's dilemma (English)
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10 July 2018
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Summary: For the iterated prisoner's dilemma there exist good strategies which solve the problem when we restrict attention to the long term average payoff. When used by both players, these assure the cooperative payoff for each of them. Neither player can benefit by moving unilaterally to any other strategy, i.e., these provide Nash equilibria. In addition, if a player uses instead an alternative which decreases the opponent's payoff below the cooperative level, then his own payoff is decreased as well. Thus, if we limit attention to the long term payoff, these strategies effectively stabilize cooperative behavior. The existence of such strategies follows from the so-called folk theorem for supergames, and the proof constructs an explicit memory-one example, which has been labeled Grim. Here we describe all the memory-one good strategies for the non-symmetric version of the prisoner's dilemma. This is the natural object of study when the payoffs are in units of the separate players' utilities. We discuss the special advantages and problems associated with some specific good strategies.
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prisoner's dilemma
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stable cooperative behavior
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iterated play
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Markov strategies
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good strategies
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individual utility
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