Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains (Q2419590): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 12:30, 19 July 2024

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Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains
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    Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains (English)
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    14 June 2019
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    generalized random dictatorships
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    top-separability
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    separability
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    multidimensional single-peakedness
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    connected\(^{+}\) domains
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    voting under constraints
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