Strategic party formation on a circle and Duverger's law (Q682489): Difference between revisions

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-.1007/s00355-016-0990-z
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1007/s00355-016-0990-z / rank @@
-Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q3254691
@@ Property / cites work: Q3254691 / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
@@ Property / cites work: Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts / rank @@
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+An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
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+Coalition and party formation in a legislative voting game
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+A general equilibrium model of multi-party competition
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+A model of political parties
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+Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems
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+A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Strategic party formation on a circle and Duverger's law
+Normal rank
@@ Property / Wikidata QID @@
+Q59460070
@@ Property / Wikidata QID: Q59460070 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / DOI @@
+.1007/S00355-016-0990-Z
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1007/S00355-016-0990-Z / rank @@
+Normal rank