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Property / author: Yves Cramer / rank
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Latest revision as of 22:11, 6 July 2024

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POWER INDICES AND THE MEASUREMENT OF CONTROL IN CORPORATE STRUCTURES
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    POWER INDICES AND THE MEASUREMENT OF CONTROL IN CORPORATE STRUCTURES (English)
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    9 October 2013
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    simple games
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    voting
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    power index
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    corporate governance
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    ownership structure
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