Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types (Q665452): Difference between revisions

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+Balanced Bayesian mechanisms
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+On the genericity of full surplus extraction in mechanism design
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+Information structures in optimal auctions
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+Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
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+Information acquisition and full surplus extraction
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+Optimal use of correlated information in mechanism design when full surplus extraction may be impossible
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+Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms
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+Contracts and productive information gathering
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+Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
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+Signal Orderings Based on Dispersion and the Supply of Private Information in Auctions
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+Beliefs, payoffs, information: on the robustness of the BDP property in models with endogenous beliefs
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+On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design
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+Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus
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+Comment on ``Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents'' [J. Econ. Theory 123 (2) (2005) 210-217]
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+Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
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+Optimal Auction Design
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+The relevance of private information in mechanism design
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+Continuity in auction design
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+The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions
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+Q3430038
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+Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents
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+Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem
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+On the interplay of hidden action and hidden information in simple bilateral trading problems
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