Campaign management under approval-driven voting rules (Q513294): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 12:06, 13 July 2024

scientific article
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Campaign management under approval-driven voting rules
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    Campaign management under approval-driven voting rules (English)
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    6 March 2017
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    approval voting
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    Bucklin voting
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    fallback voting
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    campaign management
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    bribery
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    parameterized complexity
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