Persuasion with costly precision (Q2074047): Difference between revisions

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+On the value of persuasion by experts
@@ Property / cites work: On the value of persuasion by experts / rank @@
+Normal rank
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+Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
@@ Property / cites work: Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games / rank @@
+Normal rank
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+Limited capacity in project selection: competition through evidence production
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+Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
@@ Property / cites work: Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria / rank @@
+Normal rank
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+Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games
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+Persuasion and learning by countersignaling
@@ Property / cites work: Persuasion and learning by countersignaling / rank @@
+Normal rank
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+Market signaling with grades
@@ Property / cites work: Market signaling with grades / rank @@
+Normal rank
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+Q5631860
@@ Property / cites work: Q5631860 / rank @@
+Normal rank
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+Q2816007
@@ Property / cites work: Q2816007 / rank @@
+Normal rank
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+Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
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+Competition in Persuasion
@@ Property / cites work: Competition in Persuasion / rank @@
+Normal rank
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+Sequential decisions with tests
@@ Property / cites work: Sequential decisions with tests / rank @@
+Normal rank
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+The optimal choice of pre-launch reviewer
@@ Property / cites work: The optimal choice of pre-launch reviewer / rank @@
+Normal rank
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+When to Drop a Bombshell
@@ Property / cites work: When to Drop a Bombshell / rank @@
+Normal rank
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+Persuasion with communication costs
@@ Property / cites work: Persuasion with communication costs / rank @@
+Normal rank
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+Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender
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+Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver
@@ Property / cites work: Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver / rank @@
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+MISINFORMATION*
@@ Property / cites work: MISINFORMATION* / rank @@
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+Monopolistic Signal Provision
@@ Property / cites work: Monopolistic Signal Provision / rank @@
+Normal rank
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+Informational Equilibrium
@@ Property / cites work: Informational Equilibrium / rank @@
+Normal rank